MISP contains an authorization flaw in its correlation handling during attribute searches. When a user performs an attribute search that triggers correlation lookups, the system authorized access to correlated attributes and events based on a stale distribution snapshot stored on the correlation row rather than the live event access control list.
Because the correlation rows distribution columns are a point-in-time copy that lacks a published flag, the authorization check becomes incorrect when an event is subsequently restricted (for example, its sharing group is changed or it is unpublished). As a result, an authenticated user could retrieve attributes and event details belonging to events they no longer have permission to view.
Preconditions:
An authenticated user with at least read access to some events in the instance.
The existence of correlations between events, at least one of which has been restricted after the correlation was created.
Impact:
- Confidentiality: exposure of attribute values and event metadata that the user is not authorized to access.
Affected versions: MISP prior to v2.5.48.
Weakness
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
Extended Description
Access control involves the use of several protection mechanisms such as:
When any mechanism is not applied or otherwise fails, attackers can compromise the security of the product by gaining privileges, reading sensitive information, executing commands, evading detection, etc. There are two distinct behaviors that can introduce access control weaknesses:
Potential Mitigations
- Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Related Attack Patterns
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