Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5s ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.
Weakness
The product has two different sources of the same data or information, but it uses the source that has less support for verification, is less trusted, or is less resistant to attack.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/141.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/142.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/73.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/76.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/85.html