CVE-2026-12904

NVD	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12904
CWE	https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html

The Kadence Blocks – Gutenberg Blocks for Page Builder Features plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to and including 3.7.7. This is due to a mismatch between the object used for authorization and the object actually accessed in the Optimize_Rest_Controllers create_item(), get_item(), delete_item(), and bulk_delete_items() endpoints — authorization is checked via current_user_can(edit_post/delete_post, $post_id) against the user-supplied post_id, while the storage layer keys analysis records on sha256($post_path) from a separately supplied, attacker-controlled post_path parameter, with no enforcement that post_path corresponds to post_id. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to read or delete optimizer analysis records belonging to posts owned by other users by submitting their own post_id (which passes the capability check) together with the victim posts path.

Weakness

The system’s authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user’s data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

Extended Description

Retrieval of a user record occurs in the system based on some key value that is under user control. The key would typically identify a user-related record stored in the system and would be used to lookup that record for presentation to the user. It is likely that an attacker would have to be an authenticated user in the system. However, the authorization process would not properly check the data access operation to ensure that the authenticated user performing the operation has sufficient entitlements to perform the requested data access, hence bypassing any other authorization checks present in the system. For example, attackers can look at places where user specific data is retrieved (e.g. search screens) and determine whether the key for the item being looked up is controllable externally. The key may be a hidden field in the HTML form field, might be passed as a URL parameter or as an unencrypted cookie variable, then in each of these cases it will be possible to tamper with the key value. One manifestation of this weakness is when a system uses sequential or otherwise easily-guessable session IDs that would allow one user to easily switch to another user’s session and read/modify their data.

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Weakness

Extended Description

Potential Mitigations

References