The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointments staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this->staff->getId() when $this->role === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.
Weakness
The system’s authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user’s data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
Extended Description
Retrieval of a user record occurs in the system based on some key value that is under user control. The key would typically identify a user-related record stored in the system and would be used to lookup that record for presentation to the user. It is likely that an attacker would have to be an authenticated user in the system. However, the authorization process would not properly check the data access operation to ensure that the authenticated user performing the operation has sufficient entitlements to perform the requested data access, hence bypassing any other authorization checks present in the system. For example, attackers can look at places where user specific data is retrieved (e.g. search screens) and determine whether the key for the item being looked up is controllable externally. The key may be a hidden field in the HTML form field, might be passed as a URL parameter or as an unencrypted cookie variable, then in each of these cases it will be possible to tamper with the key value. One manifestation of this weakness is when a system uses sequential or otherwise easily-guessable session IDs that would allow one user to easily switch to another user’s session and read/modify their data.
Potential Mitigations
References
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/24.9/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/Ajax.php#L17
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/24.9/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler.php#L82
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/24.9/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php#L70
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/27.7/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/Ajax.php#L17
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/27.7/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler.php#L82
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/27.7/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php#L70
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3637918%40bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool\u0026new=3637918%40bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool
- https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1600466e-ad45-4dc7-916b-6c97301d2b03?source=cve