The JetFormBuilder — Dynamic Blocks Form Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 3.6.3. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to retrieve every distinct value stored under any arbitrary wp_postmeta key on the site — including WooCommerce billing PII such as _billing_email, _billing_phone, and _billing_address fields, order totals, attachment paths, and any third-party plugin credentials or tokens stored in post meta — provided at least one published JetFormBuilder form with a get_from_db generator field exists on the site. Exploitation requires that the target site has at least one published jet-form-builder post containing a field whose generator_function is set to get_from_db; an attacker must supply a matching form ID, field name, and generator ID in the request, but all of these can be discovered by browsing the sites public forms.
Weakness
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Potential Mitigations
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Related Attack Patterns
References
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jetformbuilder/tags/3.6.0/includes/generators/get-from-db.php#L118
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jetformbuilder/tags/3.6.0/includes/generators/get-from-db.php#L160
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jetformbuilder/tags/3.6.0/modules/option-field/rest-api/generator-update-endpoint.php#L140
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jetformbuilder/tags/3.6.0/modules/option-field/rest-api/generator-update-endpoint.php#L52
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jetformbuilder/tags/3.6.0/modules/option-field/rest-api/generator-update-endpoint.php#L80
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jetformbuilder/tags/3.6.3/includes/generators/get-from-db.php#L118
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jetformbuilder/tags/3.6.3/includes/generators/get-from-db.php#L160
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jetformbuilder/tags/3.6.3/modules/option-field/rest-api/generator-update-endpoint.php#L140
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jetformbuilder/tags/3.6.3/modules/option-field/rest-api/generator-update-endpoint.php#L52
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jetformbuilder/tags/3.6.3/modules/option-field/rest-api/generator-update-endpoint.php#L80
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3591404%40jetformbuilder\u0026new=3591404%40jetformbuilder\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=
- https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/26c19bd3-32ea-4e28-9cde-1a6653acf6f1?source=cve