The miniOrange OTP Login, Verification and SMS Notifications plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass leading to Administrator Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.5.1. This is due to the um_reset_password_process_hook() function performing no server-side verification that the OTP validation step was completed, and relying solely on a public form_nonce nonce that the plugin itself emits to unauthenticated visitors via the moumprvar JavaScript object on the Ultimate Member password reset page, while still accepting the attacker-controlled username_b parameter to target any WordPress user without role restriction or any binding to a previously validated OTP session. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to obtain a freshly generated password-reset URL for an arbitrary Administrator account — returned in a 302 Location header — and use it to take full control of that account. Exploitation requires the Ultimate Member Password Reset Form integration to be active and the plugin to not be configured for phone-only reset.
Weakness
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Potential Mitigations
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Related Attack Patterns
References
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.0/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php#L181
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.0/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php#L367
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.0/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php#L372
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.0/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php#L98
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.1/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php#L181
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.1/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php#L367
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.1/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php#L372
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.1/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php#L98
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3595061%40miniorange-otp-verification\u0026new=3595061%40miniorange-otp-verification
- https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d34f4e77-f384-4d84-be32-0d349962b614?source=cve