A flaw was found in Keycloak. Keycloaks Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) broker endpoint does not properly validate encrypted assertions when the overall SAML response is not signed. An attacker with a valid signed SAML assertion can exploit this by crafting a malicious SAML response. This allows the attacker to inject an encrypted assertion for an arbitrary principal, leading to unauthorized access and potential information disclosure.
The product receives input that is expected to be of a certain type, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is actually of the expected type.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.2 | RedHat | rhbk/keycloak-operator-bundle:26.2.14-1 | * |
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.2 | RedHat | rhbk/keycloak-rhel9:26.2-16 | * |
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.2 | RedHat | rhbk/keycloak-rhel9-operator:26.2-16 | * |
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.2.14 | RedHat | rhbk/keycloak-rhel9 | * |
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4 | RedHat | rhbk/keycloak-operator-bundle:26.4.10-1 | * |
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4 | RedHat | rhbk/keycloak-rhel9:26.4-12 | * |
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4 | RedHat | rhbk/keycloak-rhel9-operator:26.4-12 | * |
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4.10 | RedHat | rhbk/keycloak-rhel9 | * |
When input does not comply with the expected type, attackers could trigger unexpected errors, cause incorrect actions to take place, or exploit latent vulnerabilities that would not be possible if the input conformed with the expected type. This weakness can appear in type-unsafe programming languages, or in programming languages that support casting or conversion of an input to another type.