A flaw in Node.js Permission Model network enforcement leaves Unix Domain Socket (UDS) server operations without the required permission checks, while all comparable network paths correctly enforce them.
As a result, code running under --permission without --allow-net can create and expose local IPC endpoints, allowing communication with other processes on the same host outside of the intended network restriction boundary.
This vulnerability affects Node.js 25.x processes using the Permission Model where --allow-net is intentionally omitted to restrict network access. Note that --allow-net is currently an experimental feature.
Weakness
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | RedHat | nodejs24-1:24.14.1-2.el10_1 | * |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | RedHat | nodejs:24-8100020260408131901.6d880403 | * |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | RedHat | nodejs:24-9070020260402152654.rhel9 | * |
| Nodejs | Ubuntu | esm-apps/xenial | * |
Extended Description
Access control involves the use of several protection mechanisms such as:
When any mechanism is not applied or otherwise fails, attackers can compromise the security of the product by gaining privileges, reading sensitive information, executing commands, evading detection, etc. There are two distinct behaviors that can introduce access control weaknesses:
Potential Mitigations
- Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Related Attack Patterns
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- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/441.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
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- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/503.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/536.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/546.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html