Cursor is a code editor built for programming with AI. Prior to 2.3, hen the Cursor Agent is running in Auto-Run Mode with Allowlist mode enabled, certain shell built-ins can still be executed without appearing in the allowlist and without requiring user approval. This allows an attacker via indirect or direct prompt injection to poison the shell environment by setting, modifying, or removing environment variables that influence trusted commands. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.3.
Weakness
One or more system settings or configuration elements can be externally controlled by a user.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cursor | Anysphere | * | 2.3 (excluding) |
Potential Mitigations
- Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/146.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/176.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/271.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/69.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/76.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/77.html