CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2026-23950

Improper Handling of Unicode Encoding

Published: Jan 20, 2026 | Modified: Jan 20, 2026
CVSS 3.x
N/A
Source:
NVD
CVSS 2.x
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
8.8 IMPORTANT
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L
Ubuntu
MEDIUM

node-tar,a Tar for Node.js, has a race condition vulnerability in versions up to and including 7.5.3. This is due to an incomplete handling of Unicode path collisions in the path-reservations system. On case-insensitive or normalization-insensitive filesystems (such as macOS APFS, In which it has been tested), the library fails to lock colliding paths (e.g., ß and ss), allowing them to be processed in parallel. This bypasses the librarys internal concurrency safeguards and permits Symlink Poisoning attacks via race conditions. The library uses a PathReservations system to ensure that metadata checks and file operations for the same path are serialized. This prevents race conditions where one entry might clobber another concurrently. This is a Race Condition which enables Arbitrary File Overwrite. This vulnerability affects users and systems using node-tar on macOS (APFS/HFS+). Because of using NFD Unicode normalization (in which ß and ss are different), conflicting paths do not have their order properly preserved under filesystems that ignore Unicode normalization (e.g., APFS (in which ß causes an inode collision with ss)). This enables an attacker to circumvent internal parallelization locks (PathReservations) using conflicting filenames within a malicious tar archive. The patch in version 7.5.4 updates path-reservations.js to use a normalization form that matches the target filesystems behavior (e.g., NFKD), followed by first toLocaleLowerCase(en) and then toLocaleUpperCase(en). As a workaround, users who cannot upgrade promptly, and who are programmatically using node-tar to extract arbitrary tarball data should filter out all SymbolicLink entries (as npm does) to defend against arbitrary file writes via this file system entry name collision issue.

Weakness

The product does not properly handle when an input contains Unicode encoding.

Potential Mitigations

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

References