manga-image-translator version beta-0.3 and prior in shared API mode contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that can lead to unauthenticated remote code execution. The FastAPI endpoints /simple_execute/{method} and /execute/{method} deserialize attacker-controlled request bodies using pickle.loads() without validation. Although a nonce-based authorization check is intended to restrict access, the nonce defaults to an empty string and the check is skipped, allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary code in the server context by sending a crafted pickle payload.
Weakness
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
Potential Mitigations
- Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization.
- An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
Related Attack Patterns
References
- https://chocapikk.com/posts/2026/manga-image-translator-pickle-rce/
- https://github.com/zyddnys/manga-image-translator/blob/a537cb12b41daf2065795058c2753d87e73fa0fe/manga_translator/mode/share.py#L112
- https://github.com/zyddnys/manga-image-translator/blob/a537cb12b41daf2065795058c2753d87e73fa0fe/manga_translator/mode/share.py#L130
- https://github.com/zyddnys/manga-image-translator/issues/1116
- https://github.com/zyddnys/manga-image-translator/issues/946
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/manga-image-translator-shared-api-unsafe-deserialization-rce