OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. In versions 2026.2.17 and below, skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py (a local helper script used when authors package skills) previously followed symlinks while building .skill archives. If an author runs this script on a crafted local skill directory containing symlinks to files outside the skill root, the resulting archive can include unintended file contents. If exploited, this vulnerability can lead to potential unintentional disclosure of local files from the packaging machine into a generated .skill artifact, but requires local execution of the packaging script on attacker-controlled skill contents. This issue has been fixed in version 2026.2.18.
Weakness
The product, when opening a file or directory, does not sufficiently account for when the file is a symbolic link that resolves to a target outside of the intended control sphere. This could allow an attacker to cause the product to operate on unauthorized files.
Potential Mitigations
- Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system.
- Denying access to a file can prevent an attacker from replacing that file with a link to a sensitive file. Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide protected areas that can be trusted.
Related Attack Patterns
References
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c275932aa4230fb7a8212fe1b9d2a18424874b3f
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/ee1d6427b544ccadd73e02b1630ea5c29ba9a9f0
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/20796
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.19
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-r6h2-5gqq-v5v6