Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. Starting in version 16.0.1 and prior to version 16.1.7, origin: null was treated as a missing origin during Server Action CSRF validation. As a result, requests from opaque contexts (such as sandboxed iframes) could bypass origin verification instead of being validated as cross-origin requests. An attacker could induce a victim browser to submit Server Actions from a sandboxed context, potentially executing state-changing actions with victim credentials (CSRF). This is fixed in version 16.1.7 by treating null as an explicit origin value and enforcing host/origin checks unless null is explicitly allowlisted in experimental.serverActions.allowedOrigins. If upgrading is not immediately possible, add CSRF tokens for sensitive Server Actions, prefer SameSite=Strict on sensitive auth cookies, and/or do not allow null in serverActions.allowedOrigins unless intentionally required and additionally protected.
Weakness
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Next.js | Vercel | 16.0.1 (including) | 16.1.7 (excluding) |
Potential Mitigations
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Use the “double-submitted cookie” method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user’s machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/111.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/462.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/467.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/62.html