HomeBox is a home inventory and organization system. Prior to 0.24.0, the authentication rate limiter (authRateLimiter) tracks failed attempts per client IP. It determines the client IP by reading, 1. X-Real-IP header, 2. First entry of X-Forwarded-For header, and 3. r.RemoteAddr (TCP connection address). These headers were read unconditionally. An attacker connecting directly to Homebox could forge any value in X-Real-IP, effectively getting a fresh rate limit identity per request. There is a TrustProxy option in the configuration (Options.TrustProxy, default false), but this option was never read by any middleware or rate limiter code. Additionally, chis middleware.RealIP was applied unconditionally in main.go, overwriting r.RemoteAddr with the forged header value before it reaches any handler. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.24.0.
Weakness
The product does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Homebox | Sysadminsmedia | * | 0.24.0 (excluding) |
Potential Mitigations
Common protection mechanisms include:
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator. [REF-45]
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/565.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/600.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/652.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/653.html