Cryptomator encrypts data being stored on cloud infrastructure. Prior to version 1.19.0, in non-debug mode Cryptomator might leak cleartext paths into the log file. This can reveal meta information about the files stored inside a vault at a time, where the actual vault is closed. Not every cleartext path is logged. Only if a filesystem request fails for some reason (e.g. damaged encrypted file, not existing file), a log message is created. This issue has been patched in version 1.19.0.
Weakness
The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cryptomator | Cryptomator | * | 1.19.0 (excluding) |
Potential Mitigations
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/215.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/463.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/54.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/7.html