The Happy Addons for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 3.21.0 via the ha_duplicate_thing admin action handler. This is due to the can_clone() method only checking current_user_can(edit_posts) (a general capability) without performing object-level authorization such as current_user_can(edit_post, $post_id), and the nonce being tied to the generic action name ha_duplicate_thing rather than to a specific post ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to clone any published post, page, or custom post type by obtaining a valid clone nonce from their own posts and changing the post_id parameter to target other users content. The clone operation copies the full post content, all post metadata (including potentially sensitive widget configurations and API tokens), and taxonomies into a new draft owned by the attacker.
Weakness
The system’s authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user’s data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
Extended Description
Retrieval of a user record occurs in the system based on some key value that is under user control. The key would typically identify a user-related record stored in the system and would be used to lookup that record for presentation to the user. It is likely that an attacker would have to be an authenticated user in the system. However, the authorization process would not properly check the data access operation to ensure that the authenticated user performing the operation has sufficient entitlements to perform the requested data access, hence bypassing any other authorization checks present in the system. For example, attackers can look at places where user specific data is retrieved (e.g. search screens) and determine whether the key for the item being looked up is controllable externally. The key may be a hidden field in the HTML form field, might be passed as a URL parameter or as an unencrypted cookie variable, then in each of these cases it will be possible to tamper with the key value. One manifestation of this weakness is when a system uses sequential or otherwise easily-guessable session IDs that would allow one user to easily switch to another user’s session and read/modify their data.
Potential Mitigations
References
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/tags/3.20.7/classes/clone-handler.php#L21
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/tags/3.20.7/classes/clone-handler.php#L61
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/trunk/classes/clone-handler.php#L21
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/trunk/classes/clone-handler.php#L61
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3475242%40happy-elementor-addons%2Ftrunk\u0026old=3463375%40happy-elementor-addons%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=
- https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9234b1ce-032f-487d-b60a-f80c78373238?source=cve