The Happy Addons for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 3.21.0 via the ha_condition_update AJAX action. This is due to the validate_reqeust() method using current_user_can(edit_posts, $template_id) instead of current_user_can(edit_post, $template_id) — failing to perform object-level authorization. Additionally, the ha_get_current_condition AJAX action lacks a capability check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to modify the display conditions of any published ha_library template. Because the cond_to_html() renderer outputs condition values into HTML attributes without proper escaping (using string concatenation instead of esc_attr()), an attacker can inject event handler attributes (e.g., onmouseover) that execute JavaScript when an administrator views the Template Conditions panel, resulting in Stored Cross-Site Scripting.
Weakness
The system’s authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user’s data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
Extended Description
Retrieval of a user record occurs in the system based on some key value that is under user control. The key would typically identify a user-related record stored in the system and would be used to lookup that record for presentation to the user. It is likely that an attacker would have to be an authenticated user in the system. However, the authorization process would not properly check the data access operation to ensure that the authenticated user performing the operation has sufficient entitlements to perform the requested data access, hence bypassing any other authorization checks present in the system. For example, attackers can look at places where user specific data is retrieved (e.g. search screens) and determine whether the key for the item being looked up is controllable externally. The key may be a hidden field in the HTML form field, might be passed as a URL parameter or as an unencrypted cookie variable, then in each of these cases it will be possible to tamper with the key value. One manifestation of this weakness is when a system uses sequential or otherwise easily-guessable session IDs that would allow one user to easily switch to another user’s session and read/modify their data.
Potential Mitigations
References
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/tags/3.20.7/classes/condition-manager.php#L237
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/tags/3.20.7/classes/condition-manager.php#L525
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/trunk/classes/condition-manager.php#L237
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/trunk/classes/condition-manager.php#L525
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3475242%40happy-elementor-addons%2Ftrunk\u0026old=3463375%40happy-elementor-addons%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=
- https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1a3fe49b-cc0d-4b29-aae5-46307483b8d4?source=cve