CVE-2026-31516

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: prevent policy_hthresh.work from racing with netns teardown

A XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO request can queue the per-net work item policy_hthresh.work onto the system workqueue.

The queued callback, xfrm_hash_rebuild(), retrieves the enclosing struct net via container_of(). If the net namespace is torn down before that work runs, the associated struct net may already have been freed, and xfrm_hash_rebuild() may then dereference stale memory.

xfrm_policy_fini() already flushes policy_hash_work during teardown, but it does not synchronize policy_hthresh.work.

Synchronize policy_hthresh.work in xfrm_policy_fini() as well, so the queued work cannot outlive the net namespace teardown and access a freed struct net.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/29fe3a61bcdce398ee3955101c39f89c01a8a77e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e2e77843fef473ef47e322d52436d8308582a96
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56ea2257b83ee29a543f158159e3d1abc1e3e4fe
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8854e9367465d784046362698731c1111e3b39b8