Sylius is an Open Source eCommerce Framework on Symfony. An authenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability exists in multiple shop LiveComponents due to unvalidated resource IDs accepted via #[LiveArg] parameters. Unlike props, which are protected by LiveComponents @checksum, args are fully user-controlled - any action that accepts a resource ID via #[LiveArg] and loads it with ->find() without ownership validation is vulnerable. Checkout address FormComponent (addressFieldUpdated action): Accepts an addressId via #[LiveArg] and loads it without verifying ownership, exposing another users first name, last name, company, phone number, street, city, postcode, and country. Cart WidgetComponent (refreshCart action): Accepts a cartId via #[LiveArg] and loads any order directly from the repository, exposing order total and item count. Cart SummaryComponent (refreshCart action): Accepts a cartId via #[LiveArg] and loads any order directly from the repository, exposing subtotal, discount, shipping cost, taxes (excluded and included), and order total. Since sylius_order contains both active carts (state=cart) and completed orders (state=new/fulfilled) in the same ID space, the cart IDOR exposes data from all orders, not just active carts. The issue is fixed in versions: 2.0.16, 2.1.12, 2.2.3 and above.
Weakness
The system’s authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user’s data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sylius | Sylius | 2.0.0 (including) | 2.0.16 (excluding) |
| Sylius | Sylius | 2.1.0 (including) | 2.1.12 (excluding) |
| Sylius | Sylius | 2.2.0 (including) | 2.2.3 (excluding) |
Extended Description
Retrieval of a user record occurs in the system based on some key value that is under user control. The key would typically identify a user-related record stored in the system and would be used to lookup that record for presentation to the user. It is likely that an attacker would have to be an authenticated user in the system. However, the authorization process would not properly check the data access operation to ensure that the authenticated user performing the operation has sufficient entitlements to perform the requested data access, hence bypassing any other authorization checks present in the system. For example, attackers can look at places where user specific data is retrieved (e.g. search screens) and determine whether the key for the item being looked up is controllable externally. The key may be a hidden field in the HTML form field, might be passed as a URL parameter or as an unencrypted cookie variable, then in each of these cases it will be possible to tamper with the key value. One manifestation of this weakness is when a system uses sequential or otherwise easily-guessable session IDs that would allow one user to easily switch to another user’s session and read/modify their data.