Edimax GS-5008PL firmware version 1.00.54 and prior contain a cross-site request forgery vulnerability that allows remote attackers to perform unauthorized administrative actions by inducing logged-in administrators to visit malicious pages. Attackers can exploit the lack of anti-CSRF tokens and request validation to change passwords, upload firmware, reboot the device, perform factory resets, or modify network configurations.
Weakness
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
Potential Mitigations
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Use the “double-submitted cookie” method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user’s machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/111.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/462.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/467.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/62.html