CoreDNS is a DNS server that chains plugins. In versions prior to 1.14.3, the DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) GET path accepts oversized dns= query parameter values and performs URL query parsing, base64 decoding, and DNS message unpacking before rejecting the request. Unlike the POST path, which applies a bounded read via http.MaxBytesReader limited to 65536 bytes, the GET path has no equivalent size validation before expensive processing. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly send oversized DoH GET requests to force high CPU usage, large transient memory allocations, and elevated garbage-collection pressure, leading to denial of service. This issue has been fixed in version 1.14.3.
Weakness
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coredns | Coredns.io | * | 1.14.3 (excluding) |
| Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2.14 | RedHat | rhacm2/lighthouse-agent-rhel9:1780204232 | * |
| Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2.14 | RedHat | rhacm2/lighthouse-coredns-rhel9:1780204249 | * |
Potential Mitigations
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/147.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/492.html