DeepDiff is a project focused on Deep Difference and search of any Python data. From version 5.0.0 to before version 8.6.2, the pickle unpickler _RestrictedUnpickler validates which classes can be loaded but does not limit their constructor arguments. A few of the types in SAFE_TO_IMPORT have constructors that allocate memory proportional to their input (builtins.bytes, builtins.list, builtins.range). A 40-byte pickle payload can force 10+ GB of memory, which crashes applications that load delta objects or call pickle_load with untrusted data. This issue has been patched in version 8.6.2.
Weakness
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deepdiff | Qluster | 5.0.0 (including) | 8.6.2 (excluding) |
Potential Mitigations
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/147.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/492.html