Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.5, 40.8.5, 41.1.0, and 42.0.0-alpha.5, when a renderer calls window.open() with a target name, Electron did not correctly scope the named-window lookup to the openers browsing context group. A renderer could navigate an existing child window that was opened by a different, unrelated renderer if both used the same target name. If that existing child was created with more permissive webPreferences (via setWindowOpenHandlers overrideBrowserWindowOptions), content loaded by the second renderer inherits those permissions. Apps are only affected if they open multiple top-level windows with differing trust levels and use setWindowOpenHandler to grant child windows elevated webPreferences such as a privileged preload script. Apps that do not elevate child window privileges, or that use a single top-level window, are not affected. Apps that additionally grant nodeIntegration: true or sandbox: false to child windows (contrary to the security recommendations) may be exposed to arbitrary code execution. This vulnerability is fixed in 39.8.5, 40.8.5, 41.1.0, and 42.0.0-alpha.5.
Weakness
The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Electron | Electronjs | * | 39.8.4 (including) |
| Electron | Electronjs | 40.0.0 (including) | 40.8.4 (including) |
| Electron | Electronjs | 41.0.0 (including) | 41.1.0 (excluding) |
| Electron | Electronjs | 41.2.0 (including) | 41.2.0 (including) |
| Electron | Electronjs | 42.0.0-alpha1 (including) | 42.0.0-alpha1 (including) |
| Electron | Electronjs | 42.0.0-alpha2 (including) | 42.0.0-alpha2 (including) |
| Electron | Electronjs | 42.0.0-alpha3 (including) | 42.0.0-alpha3 (including) |
| Electron | Electronjs | 42.0.0-alpha4 (including) | 42.0.0-alpha4 (including) |
Extended Description
Resources such as files and directories may be inadvertently exposed through mechanisms such as insecure permissions, or when a program accidentally operates on the wrong object. For example, a program may intend that private files can only be provided to a specific user. This effectively defines a control sphere that is intended to prevent attackers from accessing these private files. If the file permissions are insecure, then parties other than the user will be able to access those files. A separate control sphere might effectively require that the user can only access the private files, but not any other files on the system. If the program does not ensure that the user is only requesting private files, then the user might be able to access other files on the system. In either case, the end result is that a resource has been exposed to the wrong party.