An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS 3.x before 3.6.6. An out-of-bounds read vulnerability in mbedtls_ccm_finish() in library/ccm.c allows attackers to obtain adjacent CCM context data via invocation of the multipart CCM API with an oversized tag_len parameter. This is caused by missing validation of the tag_len parameter against the size of the internal 16-byte authentication buffer. The issue affects the public multipart CCM API in Mbed TLS 3.x, where mbedtls_ccm_finish() can be invoked directly by applications. In Mbed TLS 4.x versions prior to the fix, the same missing validation exists in the internal implementation; however, the function is not exposed as part of the public API. Exploitation requires application-level invocation of the multipart CCM API.
Weakness
The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mbed_tls | Trustedfirmware | 3.1.0 (including) | 3.6.6 (excluding) |
| Mbedtls | Ubuntu | esm-apps/xenial | * |
Potential Mitigations
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.