A Dag author could either (a) create a symlink under their tasks log directory pointing to an arbitrary file readable by the API server process (read-path attack — e.g. /etc/passwd or airflow.cfg) or (b) supply a task_id containing .. sequences accepted by the Task SDKs KEY_REGEX (write-path attack), and in both cases the FileTaskHandler resolves the log path outside the configured base_log_folder, leaking or overwriting arbitrary files. Only affects deployments where the worker log folder is shared with the API server. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.2.2 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deploy the worker and API server with separate log volumes so that worker-controlled paths cannot reach the API servers filesystem.
Weakness
The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Airflow | Apache | * | 3.2.2 (excluding) |
Potential Mitigations
- Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system.
- Denying access to a file can prevent an attacker from replacing that file with a link to a sensitive file. Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide protected areas that can be trusted.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/35.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/76.html