CVE-2026-43275

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: ufs: core: Flush exception handling work when RPM level is zero

Ensure that the exception event handling work is explicitly flushed during suspend when the runtime power management level is set to UFS_PM_LVL_0.

When the RPM level is zero, the device power mode and link state both remain active. Previously, the UFS core driver bypassed flushing exception event handling jobs in this configuration. This created a race condition where the driver could attempt to access the host controller to handle an exception after the system had already entered a deep power-down state, resulting in a system crash.

Explicitly flush this work and disable auto BKOPs before the suspend callback proceeds. This guarantees that pending exception tasks complete and prevents illegal hardware access during the power-down sequence.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d186731bc335cc049d4e57ab9f563cfab95593e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78d8e2d6352e8317686ee3a44811ac14c415a57d
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa8d68d97c7f0ef966e51afc17fdbdc372700edf
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aac2fee7513dd25042a616f86a1469b4858d2c5c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab71c146c135f9af1614ef0fc29a0a3b84f1a373
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5c3a1a13f97355c397f9439d79cb04b182958a3
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8ef441811ec413717f188f63d99182f30f0f08e