rabbitmq-c is a C-language AMQP client library for RabbitMQ. Prior to 0.16.0, a malicious AMQP server can send an undersized connection.tune.frame_max value during amqp_login(), and rabbitmq-c accepts the value in amqp_login_inner() in librabbitmq/amqp_socket.c. amqp_tune_connection() in librabbitmq/amqp_connection.c uses frame_max to reallocate the outbound buffer without enforcing AMQP_FRAME_MIN_SIZE. Immediate serialization of connection.tune-ok through amqp_frame_to_bytes() writes beyond the undersized heap allocation, causing memory corruption and likely denial of service. An on-path attacker can also trigger the flaw against plaintext AMQP traffic. Code execution is theoretically possible but was not demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 0.16.0.
Weakness
A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc().
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Librabbitmq | Ubuntu | esm-apps-legacy/xenial | * |
| Librabbitmq | Ubuntu | esm-apps/bionic | * |
| Librabbitmq | Ubuntu | esm-infra-legacy/trusty | * |
| Librabbitmq | Ubuntu | esm-infra/focal | * |
| Librabbitmq | Ubuntu | jammy | * |
| Librabbitmq | Ubuntu | noble | * |
| Librabbitmq | Ubuntu | questing | * |
| Librabbitmq | Ubuntu | resolute | * |
| Librabbitmq | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
Potential Mitigations
- Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
- D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
- Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
- Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
- For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Related Attack Patterns
References
- https://github.com/alanxz/rabbitmq-c/commit/4777d0b5c58cb02966a04a85832436bd66ed5d1f
- https://github.com/alanxz/rabbitmq-c/pull/879
- https://github.com/alanxz/rabbitmq-c/releases/tag/v0.16.0
- https://github.com/alanxz/rabbitmq-c/security/advisories/GHSA-jh48-qjf5-fx5v
- https://github.com/alanxz/rabbitmq-c/security/advisories/GHSA-jh48-qjf5-fx5v