Net::CIDR::Lite versions before 0.24 for Perl does not properly validate IP address and CIDR mask inputs, which may allow IP ACL bypass.
Inputs containing a trailing newline or non-ASCII digit characters pass the validators but are then re-encoded by the parser to a different address than the input string spelled. find() and bin_find() can match or miss addresses as a result.
Example:
my $cidr = Net::CIDR::Lite->new(); $cidr->add(::1n/128); $cidr->find(::1a); # incorrectly returns true
See also CVE-2026-45191.
The product receives an input value that is used as a resource identifier or other type of reference, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is equivalent to a potentially-unsafe value.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Libnet-cidr-lite-perl | Ubuntu | esm-apps-legacy/xenial | * |
| Libnet-cidr-lite-perl | Ubuntu | esm-infra/bionic | * |
| Libnet-cidr-lite-perl | Ubuntu | esm-infra/focal | * |
| Libnet-cidr-lite-perl | Ubuntu | jammy | * |
| Libnet-cidr-lite-perl | Ubuntu | noble | * |
| Libnet-cidr-lite-perl | Ubuntu | questing | * |
| Libnet-cidr-lite-perl | Ubuntu | resolute | * |
| Libnet-cidr-lite-perl | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
Attackers can sometimes bypass input validation schemes by finding inputs that appear to be safe, but will be dangerous when processed at a lower layer or by a downstream component. For example, a simple XSS protection mechanism might try to validate that an input has no “” tags using case-sensitive matching, but since HTML is case-insensitive when processed by web browsers, an attacker could inject “” and trigger XSS.