Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Nettys DNS resolver uses a predictable PRNG for generating DNS transaction IDs and defaults to a static UDP source port. This combination reduces the entropy of DNS queries, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning (Kaminsky attack). Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
Weakness
The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Netty | Netty | * | 4.1.135 (excluding) |
| Netty | Netty | 4.2.0 (including) | 4.2.15 (excluding) |
| Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.27.4.SP1 | RedHat | netty-resolver-dns | * |
| Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.33.2.SP1 | RedHat | netty-resolver-dns | * |
Potential Mitigations
- Use a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and select well-tested implementations with adequate length seeds.
- In general, if a pseudo-random number generator is not advertised as being cryptographically secure, then it is probably a statistical PRNG and should not be used in security-sensitive contexts.
- Pseudo-random number generators can produce predictable numbers if the generator is known and the seed can be guessed. A 256-bit seed is a good starting point for producing a “random enough” number.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/112.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/485.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/59.html