decode-uri-component through 0.4.1 is vulnerable to denial of service. The decode() function splits input on % producing N tokens and calls decodeComponents(), exhibiting super-linear parsing time: 200 %ab tokens takes approximately 0.7s, 700 tokens approximately 6s, and 1400 tokens approximately 33s. An attacker can cause significant CPU consumption and event-loop blocking via crafted input.
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Migration Toolkit 1.8 | RedHat | rhmtc/openshift-migration-ui-rhel8:1783690532 | * |
| Red Hat Quay 3.1 | RedHat | quay/quay-rhel8:1783750447 | * |
| Red Hat Quay 3.12 | RedHat | quay/quay-rhel8:1783751865 | * |
| Red Hat Quay 3.12 | RedHat | quay/quay-rhel8:1784353904 | * |
| Red Hat Quay 3.15 | RedHat | quay/quay-rhel8:1785261506 | * |
| Red Hat Quay 3.16 | RedHat | quay/quay-rhel9:1783955846 | * |
| Red Hat Quay 3.9 | RedHat | quay/quay-rhel8:1784125838 | * |
| Red Hat Satellite 6.18 | RedHat | satellite/iop-vulnerability-frontend-rhel9:1785762027 | * |
| Red Hat Satellite 6.19 | RedHat | satellite/iop-vulnerability-frontend-rhel9:1785937325 | * |
| Node-source-map-resolve | Ubuntu | questing | * |
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.