CVE-2026-46300

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: skbuff: preserve shared-frag marker during coalescing

skb_try_coalesce() can attach paged frags from @from to @to. If @from has SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG set, the resulting @to skb can contain the same externally-owned or page-cache-backed frags, but the shared-frag marker is currently lost.

That breaks the invariant relied on by later in-place writers. In particular, ESP input checks skb_has_shared_frag() before deciding whether an uncloned nonlinear skb can skip skb_cow_data(). If TCP receive coalescing has moved shared frags into an unmarked skb, ESP can see skb_has_shared_frag() as false and decrypt in place over page-cache backed frags.

Propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG when skb_try_coalesce() transfers paged frags. The tailroom copy path does not need the marker because it copies bytes into @tos linear data rather than transferring frag descriptors.

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

• Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

• Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f2b16022a2e10ca7bccfb98db5ed2ec0f72641c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3599e6b3cc1ada96883d496a50a210d3afbb6987
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3884358a9286b17f389a72b1426fc4547c23c111
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bd9e113d50034db99d7ef69fd8e5242d15e414a
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/760e1addc27ba1a7beb4a0a7e8b3e9ec49e7a34e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78bf6b6bb19541d19fbda6242e7cfe2c682763c0
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d3e5fd19fe1063bf607219e8562fbd567b8e8d5
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f84eca5817390257cef78013d0112481c503b4a3
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/13/5
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/21/11
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/21/12
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/21/13