CVE-2026-53196

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in get_manuf_info()

get_manuf_info() reads le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) bytes from the device I2C EEPROM into a buffer allocated with kmalloc_obj(), which is sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor) = 10 bytes.

The Size field comes from the device and is only validated (in check_i2c_image()) to make sure the descriptor fits within TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE (16384 bytes), not against the destination buffer size. A malicious USB device can therefore set Size to any value up to 16377, causing a heap overflow of up to 16367 bytes when plugged into a host running this driver.

valid_csum() is called after read_rom() and also iterates buffer[0..Size-1], compounding the out-of-bounds access.

Fix by rejecting descriptors with unexpected length before calling read_rom().

[ johan: amend commit message; also check for short descriptors ]

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

• Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

• Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/183c1076eca43bbb3e7bdf597456f91d81c73e74
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/561edb021486e6723d841926aa4b48097da06190
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b849f30d1a9e66aae6b715aaef66e427390cb081
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfd634f6dfd40c49a84f9bddc2867a80e2e2623a
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d214d2341d4f9f447e36a7d012cdf6a6631a55f1
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d92f17af7097d10bdeddf26f66f34b354104b277
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e168db91442b94e64fa82a7dd297983d48ea5cc0
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f96cf7bf9fbf15d7fcf0c91fec47ba8a010369ea
• https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53196
• https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492750
• https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-53196.json