Hermes Agent before 0.16.0 creates response_store.db and webhook_subscriptions.json with world-readable permissions (mode 0o644), exposing conversation history and HMAC secrets to local users. Attackers with local filesystem access can read these files directly to obtain sensitive data including conversation history, tool payloads, prompts, and per-route HMAC secrets.
Weakness
During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files.
Potential Mitigations
- Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/81.html
References
- https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/commit/3bace071bfadf2d2bec2ee048471a31ec920e3e8
- https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/30917
- https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/31469
- https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/releases/tag/v2026.6.5
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/hermes-agent-sensitive-file-permission-vulnerability-in-store-files
- https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/30917