CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2026-54873

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Published: Sep 29, 2026 | Modified: Sep 30, 2026
CVSS 3.x
N/A
Source:
NVD
CVSS 2.x
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
5.3 MODERATE
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Ubuntu
LOW
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Issue summary: QUIC process may keep memory for QUIC packet buffer for much longer period than necessary.

Impact summary: Remote peer can exploit this vulnerability by sending maliciously crafted packets, making the local QUIC stack to keep the memory for packet buffers allocated. The time for which the memory remains allocated is entirely under the control of the potentially malicious remote peer.

CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Description: To save copy operation from the packet buffer to the stream reassemble buffer the QUIC stack leaves the stream data on the packet buffer waiting to be copied to a buffer provided by the local receiving application. The QUIC stack releases a reference to the packet buffer only after the data are copied to the application buffer. This design is more efficient for legitimate data transfers but enables an attacker to allocate a lot more memory than actually required by the data kept in the receiving stream buffer.

To mitigate the vulnerability, the QUIC stack now calculates and monitors memory overhead for every stream. The memory overhead for a single stream frame is calculated as a difference between the size of the whole packet that carries the stream frame and the size of the stream frame itself. The memory overhead for a single stream frame is added to the total (cumulative) memory overhead QUIC stack keeps for each stream. Once the cumulative memory overhead exceeds 64kB, the QUIC stack moves the stream frame data from the packet buffer to the stream buffer, starting with the next packet received.

FIPS impact: no The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.

Weakness

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

Affected Software

NameVendorStart VersionEnd Version
Red Hat Hardened ImagesRedHatopenssl-main-3.5.9-0.1.hum1*
Red Hat Hardened ImagesRedHatopenssl3-main-3.5.9-0.1.hum1*
Edk2Ubuntudevel*
Edk2Ubunturesolute*
Edk2-hweUbuntudevel*
Edk2-hweUbunturesolute*
NodejsUbuntuesm-apps/jammy*
NodejsUbuntujammy*
OpensslUbuntudevel*
OpensslUbunturesolute*
OpensslUbuntuupstream*

Potential Mitigations

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”

  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:

  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.

  • The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.

  • If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.

  • Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

  • Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.

  • When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.

  • Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).

References