CVE-2026-63971

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: fix race between sctp_wait_for_connect and peeloff

sctp_wait_for_connect() drops and re-acquires the socket lock while waiting for the association to reach ESTABLISHED state. During this window, another thread can peeloff the association to a new socket via getsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF), changing asoc->base.sk. After re-acquiring the old socket lock, sctp_wait_for_connect() returns success without noticing the migration — the caller then accesses the association under the wrong lock in sctp_datamsg_from_user().

Add the same sk != asoc->base.sk check that sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() already has, returning an error if the association was migrated while we slept.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e0d5bc76fd4267a71334fcc8f1a5fbcf997845d
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6140cfa721451fa6e18e134e709703c2bf34d0fb
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/634a9af8a26a84d8b0d7b3b643204b344b42d9fb
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68667ee4c7dadf7f63167234e2a1af09b3f7874e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d2038d4b80166f7bead8d07eba3b97405816c21
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e9b56051d24540cfbf39194618708c4a7633549
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcfeac79af740735ace44008b4a11b8e5add20f5
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f14fe6395a8b3d961a61e138ad7b36ba3626dd4e