CVE-2026-64038

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

hwmon: (lm90) Stop work before releasing hwmon device

Sashiko reports:

In lm90_probe(), the devm action to cancel the alert_work and report_work (lm90_restore_conf) is registered in lm90_init_client() before devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info() is called.

Because devm executes cleanup actions in reverse order during module unbind or probe failure, the hwmon device is unregistered and freed first.

If lm90_alert_work() or lm90_report_alarms() runs in the window between the hwmon device being freed and the delayed works being cancelled, lm90_update_alarms() will dereference the freed data->hwmon_dev here.

Fix the problem by canceling the workers separately after registering the hwmon device and before registering the interrupt handler. This ensures that the workers are canceled after interrupts are disabled and before the hwmon device is released. Add shutdown flag to indicate that device shutdown is in progress to prevent workers from being re-armed.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fe96176636cb17906680c098688b144bd9c1c45
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/479e297526aeb19c745eac5c1897f455f83dc5f8
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c116abf208dd97c4ceb76c5c50c9bc34a017796
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b09a45601094c7f4ec4db8090b825fa61e169d93
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c98107817b0f6cdf51adc5e84e75c39ee25d8b28