CVE-2026-64115

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vsock/vmci: fix UAF when peer resets connection during handshake

vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server() returned err = 0 for a peer RST in its default switch arm:

err = pkt->type == VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST ? 0 : -EINVAL;

That made vmci_transport_recv_listen() skip vsock_remove_pending(), leaving the pending socket on the listeners pending_links with sk_state = TCP_CLOSE while destroy: still dropped the explicit reference taken before schedule_delayed_work().

One second later vsock_pending_work() observed is_pending=true and performed full cleanup: vsock_remove_pending() then the two trailing sock_put(sk) calls – the first reached refcount 0 and __sk_freed the socket, and the second wrote into the freed object:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in refcount_warn_saturate Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800b1cac80 by task kworker Workqueue: events vsock_pending_work

Treat peer RST like any other unexpected packet type (err = -EINVAL). All destroy: arms now return err < 0, so vmci_transport_recv_listen() removes pending from pending_links synchronously and vsock_pending_work() takes the is_pending=false / !rejected branch, dropping only its own work reference. This also closes the multi-packet race Sashiko reported on v2: pending is removed from the list before any subsequent packet can find it.

The pre-existing sk_acceptq_removed() gap on the err < 0 path of vmci_transport_recv_listen() that Sashiko also noted is not introduced or changed by this patch.

Tested on lts-6.12.79 with KASAN: 52/100 unpatched -> 0/100 patched.

Weakness

The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory “belongs” to the code that operates on the new pointer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1dd531e28f61edd286edc486ab068f135b5ae1eb
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e19f08552b90070ed18bafb1763c78297823af6
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/440447699c681e26ed58e9c309cad718270a18b4
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47e63077605c6c2aa45b3df9847a8cdc1f1f6ef9
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99e22ddf4edb63dc8382bc028af928056d3450cf
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fe74e42914c851d68069713b7b917a9c33faf26
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc27e989a5dfdfcfc1cca7c3be27a0c7532b46cb
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ecda37f8faab3220da199335e42564cb7a9ad145