In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length
nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes.
A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or performs the host response memcmp.
With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication.
Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(data) + 2hl + dhvlen <= tl before any access to the variable-length fields.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a413ece2504c70aa34a20be4dafec04e8c741f9
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d7649c1231dac14d906985d2936967e23041c26
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80cd28b56ab62d3e7ed0a7bf05282e6d3ee5b2a0
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/999f6205ede984a786f35f727b01f971b98e215d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/caa71b3a43ea5c13fe7141cb019ebcb03b8ac857