In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size
udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partitions start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size:
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset =
le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader);
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries =
(sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size -
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2;
lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the block > s_num_entries bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads
((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block]
so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inodes in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one entry within the VAT inode.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ad2d09a8d66fa8dc6f9b70d660b5fb4478ea934
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2900e02a0dd4fc30ac9840e7ce4ca0b041ab0d63
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55287a3555ff0515b3aff181d2c08c0462a41709
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74580fdf022909e184223cacc364feb826982d96
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/883962731420ec271ed8c1cd76524f4b17faa982
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb0d384c1f42a5b7ace0bd88fee80b9bb1d49acb
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8202786b3d75125c84ebc4de6d946f92fde0ee8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e610fb113cdfa8bf4247c9bf4f2337b81ad4ddad