In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: use opener credentials for delete-on-close
Delete-on-close can be completed by deferred or durable handle teardown, where no request work is available. Both the base-file unlink and the ADS xattr removal consequently run with the ksmbd worker credentials and can bypass filesystem permission checks.
Run both operations with the credentials captured in struct file when the handle was opened. This preserves the authenticated users fsuid, fsgid, supplementary groups and capability restrictions at final close.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18c59109bb6fb816d5102171666f87cf1e29901d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b7059974549d278e30fe70e2a4e421f9839817d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52e2f21911158ec961cd5aae19c56460db382af0
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e72c15085b6d86f45d224d98aa75b5cace4aaab9
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f08b3f451f12eee4abd8a5981803bc36db84458b