CVE-2026-64523

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit

handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold.

Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path.

The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup – sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction – with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction.

The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch.

Affected Software

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09dba37eee70d0596e26645015f1aa95a9848e9d
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16eaba5aa89c04eea125905bb8f988c1897f4f29
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/685b10dd0e32c7782cead16c8cf055c609678583