In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion
log_replay() converts DIR_PAGE_ENTRY_32 records into DIR_PAGE_ENTRY records when replaying version 0 restart tables.
During this conversion, the memmove() length is derived directly from the on-disk lcns_follow field:
memmove(&dp->vcn, &dp0->vcn_low,
2 * sizeof(u64) +
le32_to_cpu(dp->lcns_follow) * sizeof(u64));
check_rstbl() validates restart table structure, but does not constrain per-entry lcns_follow values relative to the entry size. A malformed filesystem image can provide an oversized lcns_follow value, causing the conversion memmove() to access memory beyond the bounds of the allocated restart table buffer.
The same field is later used to bound iteration over page_lcns[], so validating lcns_follow during conversion also prevents downstream out-of-bounds access from the same malformed metadata.
Compute the maximum valid lcns_follow from the already-validated restart table entry size and reject entries that exceed this bound. Reuse the existing t16/t32 scratch variables already declared in log_replay() to avoid introducing new declarations.
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: fixed the conflicts]
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/159f694d682e4215b3822ae31ed3a4631628fe55
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32b9f8733feb241627fa5f564b1a99b5cae974c5
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/57c071e2c4f30b9c6f5aacb6679aab1269fbae99
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a4c53a2e26a865565bd6a460961e8d6fcb32329
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7adb38279812c9c06b0e3fa7382f4d7887f3fa2d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca343a99806b4fc8e27c48f08be3445c5fcd1445
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddfc8683e1a627dbf1b83bacf8961443dd654258