DOMPurify before 3.4.7 (affected versions <= 3.4.5) passes direct references to the module-level DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS and DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR sets to the uponSanitizeElement and uponSanitizeAttribute hooks via data.allowedTags / data.allowedAttributes when sanitize is called without an explicit cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS / cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR array. A hook that mutates these fields permanently widens the default allow-lists for the lifetime of the DOMPurify instance, so all subsequent default-config sanitize calls inherit the widened defaults and attacker payloads using the poisoned tag/attribute name survive sanitization. removeAllHooks(), clearConfig(), and passing a fresh cfg do not recover the state; only constructing a new DOMPurify instance does.
Weakness
The product mixes trusted and untrusted data in the same data structure or structured message.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dompurify | Cure53 | * | 3.4.7 (excluding) |
| Node-dompurify | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
References
- https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/7996f1dc78eb8b7922388aed75d94a9f8fad9a36
- https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-76mc-f452-cxcm
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dompurify-before-hook-mutation-pollution-via-allowedtags
- https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-76mc-f452-cxcm