libssh2 through 1.11.1, fixed in commit a13bb6c, contains a missing bounds check vulnerability that allows a malicious SSH server to trigger an arbitrary-length heap out-of-bounds read and a free of an uninitialized pointer via the publickey subsystem. In libssh2_publickey_list_fetch(), the version 1 response parser reads a server-controlled comment_len value and advances the parse pointer without verifying sufficient bytes remain in the buffer, causing the out-of-bounds read to leak heap pointers from adjacent allocations defeating ASLR, followed by heap allocator state corruption when the error cleanup path frees an uninitialized pointer from a non-zeroed realloc() region.
Weakness
The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
Potential Mitigations
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.