In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer
virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds read / info leak).
Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array. Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2757e6e803092cf0aeaf4b735e16b5d3bdc705c5
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35be0e2c6862abcd5e5f5445261f1fd910d4a9b4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/375c1934ef0196d3b6d3a1eae3232bef8dae7bf7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e1a53892ba7f8a3e1da6bfc53c83ae7c812dccd
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fc2a017c5d597937e0c28b9a9669844aa796c42