CVE-2026-68458

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

binder: cache secctx size before release zeroes it

binder_transaction() bounds the scatter-gather buffer area with sg_buf_end_offset and subtracts the aligned LSM context size because the secctx is written at the tail of that area. The subtraction reads lsmctx.len, but that field has already been cleared by the time the line runs:

security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &lsmctx)   /* lsmctx.len set */
lsmctx_aligned_size = ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64))
extra_buffers_size += lsmctx_aligned_size
...
security_release_secctx(&lsmctx)            /* memset zeroes len */
...
sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size
                    - ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64)) /* ALIGN(0,8) */

security_release_secctx() does memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp)), so lsmctx.len reads back as 0 and the subtraction contributes nothing, leaving sg_buf_end_offset too large by the aligned secctx size on every transaction to a txn_security_ctx node.

Each BINDER_TYPE_PTR object then derives buf_left = sg_buf_end_offset - sg_buf_offset as the sole upper bound on its copy, so the inflated end offset lets the copy run into the bytes that already hold the secctx.

The aligned size must therefore be cached before release rather than re-read from the now-cleared field. Fix by caching it in lsmctx_aligned_size at function scope when it is first computed and subtracting lsmctx_aligned_size instead of re-reading lsmctx.len after release. Reuse the same value for the earlier buf_offset computation.

Affected Software

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1228926e1e4d605cc74d9e675558982a6f2cf446
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4257f45ee1fddd0558e77b62af8bb63fd87b2162
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b34826e55aad3520ec813f1f367c11b24b29dc9f