In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btrtl: validate firmware patch bounds
rtlbt_parse_firmware() copies patch_length - 4 bytes before appending the firmware version. A malformed firmware patch shorter than the version field can make this subtraction underflow and turn the copy into an oversized read and write during Bluetooth setup.
The existing patch_offset + patch_length check can also wrap on 32-bit architectures. Validate the patch length and range without arithmetic overflow before allocating or copying the patch.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39e01b4addfbbe177567d6ed1dfb81f9cccb19e6
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/609c5b04a28dc1b0f3af6a7bc93055135b2d2059
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6744ab60dfac55d1df5733960aad5be300984301
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68c5a2a19987c035eb129e627e579adafb04f637
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/83534891c058ed71e251135072640911670869aa
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4cb830e0b55ac76c849fd7840afb251f4c028fa
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bda3c598ade6ea03884074b91e31608326684921
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1ca750c0510bdbb504bf084d2f196ef2af92ea6