Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, the native autofill popup could be positioned by a cross-origin iframe outside that iframes bounds, over the embedding pages UI, enabling clickjacking or spoofing of trusted UI. Apps are only affected if they embed untrusted content in iframes within windows that also display trusted UI. Apps that do not embed untrusted third-party content are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3.
Weakness
The web application does not restrict or incorrectly restricts frame objects or UI layers that belong to another application or domain.
Potential Mitigations
- The use of X-Frame-Options allows developers of web content to restrict the usage of their application within the form of overlays, frames, or iFrames. The developer can indicate from which domains can frame the content.
- The concept of X-Frame-Options is well documented, but implementation of this protection mechanism is in development to cover gaps. There is a need for allowing frames from multiple domains.
- A developer can use a “frame-breaker” script in each page that should not be framed. This is very helpful for legacy browsers that do not support X-Frame-Options security feature previously mentioned.
- It is also important to note that this tactic has been circumvented or bypassed. Improper usage of frames can persist in the web application through nested frames. The “frame-breaking” script does not intuitively account for multiple nested frames that can be presented to the user.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/103.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/181.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/222.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/504.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/506.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/587.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/654.html