In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: thunderbolt: Fix frags[] overflow by bounding frame_count
tbnet_poll() assembles a multi-frame ThunderboltIP packet into one skb. The first frame goes into the skb linear area and every further frame is added as a page fragment.
skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags,
page, hdr_size, frame_size,
TBNET_RX_PAGE_SIZE - hdr_size);
A packet of frame_count frames therefore ends up with frame_count - 1 fragments. tbnet_check_frame() only bounds the peer supplied frame_count to TBNET_RING_SIZE / 4 (64), which is far above MAX_SKB_FRAGS (17 by default). A peer that sends a packet of 19 or more small frames pushes nr_frags past MAX_SKB_FRAGS, so skb_add_rx_frag() writes past skb_shinfo()->frags[] and corrupts memory after the shared info.
Tighten the start of packet bound to MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 so a packet can never produce more fragments than frags[] can hold. This matches the recent skb frags overflow fixes in other receive paths, for example f0813bcd2d9d (net: wwan: t7xx: fix potential skb->frags overflow in RX path) and 600dc40554dc (net: usb: cdc-phonet: fix skb frags[] overflow in rx_complete()).
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b3b4e5ff5a58ad32817824b0310e63908b12052
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55d9895f89970501fe126d1026b586b04a224c27
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e27beb4536cbf1d59e2d8c2840e87d972aba906f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5824d5b841d99a2bcdd4e2c256643293bbc22c1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe6b606fbf0c3beb94ccf17fcf31d8c2138264e3