In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: bound copy_lcns dp->page_lcns[] index in analysis pass
In log_replay()s analysis pass, after find_dp() returns a valid DIR_PAGE_ENTRY for the (target_attr, target_vcn) tuple, the copy_lcns block walks lrh->lcns_follow further entries:
t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh->lcns_follow);
for (i = 0; i < t16; i++) {
size_t j = (size_t)(le64_to_cpu(lrh->target_vcn) -
le64_to_cpu(dp->vcn));
dp->page_lcns[j + i] = lrh->page_lcns[i];
}
find_dp() only validates that target_vcn falls within [dp->vcn, dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow), i.e., that the FIRST cluster is covered. The walk through the further entries is not bounded against dp->lcns_follow. For a malformed LRH where target_vcn = dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow - 1 and lrh->lcns_follow > 1, the i > 0 writes overflow the dps allocated page_lcns[] array.
Add the missing j + lrh->lcns_follow <= dp->lcns_follow guard.
Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 as a slab-out-of-bounds write of size 8 from log_replay+0x68d4 on the mount path.
This is distinct from Pavitra Jhas 2026-05-02 patch (fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion, 20260502154252.164586-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com) which addresses the separate version-0 dirty-page-table conversion paths memmove(&dp->vcn, …) call. The two fixes are complementary; both should land.
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes, fixed conflicts]
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f13e823bf86bd1800168ea0bb5bca8b8500a81c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49c86dae0c0ccb8d98ddcdc46987259389c816dd
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e7b598660cfa8e5af172cf4c65cffc126333307
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b3d8cc9d54fcded4de51b2b1026ae7182512077
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b7c28d8c61bdb041936222a09a708531a1c2921
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d240cd98f5f7b65c90f6b2b6abe3232ccdc405ab